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PETER A. DONOVAN*
The decade of the 1960's achieved remarkable results in the area
of environmental reform. Change occurred on several levels as society
awakened to the consequences of the increasing degradation of our en-
vironment. The voice of an aroused scientific community was heard
warning of impending dangers, and its study and documentation of the
impact of non-circumspect technology upon the environment had its
effect. Quickly the media began to publicize such now-familiar dangers
as the sudden accretion of toxic wastes in the air and water, the presence
of dangerous metals such as mercury in the food chain, the imminent
shortages of potable water and food supplies, the increasingly rapid
deterioration of the inner cities, the psychological and physiological
harm resulting from constant noise assault and increasing population
density, the growing stockpile of deadly radioactive wastes, the pollu-
tion of the soil with pesticides and herbicides, the peril of thermal im-
balance, and the presence of oil and other pollutants in the oceans.
The decade of the sixties also saw marked growth on the part of
environmental organizations. Such old and established conservation or-
ganizations as the Sierra Club were able to expand their membership
and commit resources to environmental reform on an expanded national
basis.' These conservation societies were joined by newly formed en-
vironmental organizations, such as the Environmental Defense Fund,
which were founded to play an active role in defending the environment
* Professor of Law, Boston College Law School, Chairman, Faculty Committee on
Publications.
1 The impact of the Sierra Club's activities on environmental reform is evident in
such cases as Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727 (1972); Citizens Comm. for the Hudson
Valley v. Volpe, 425 F.2d 97 (2d Cir. 1970); Sierra Club v. Mason, — F. Supp. —, 4
E.R.C. 1686 (0. Conn. 1972); Sierra Club v. Ruckelshaus, 344 F. Supp. 235 (D.D.C.),
aff'd per curiam, — F.2d —, 4 E.R.C. 1815 (D.C. Cir. 1972), cert. granted, 41 U.S.L.W.
.3392 (U.S. Jan. 15, 1973).
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through litigation and lobbying efforts as well as by pursuing traditional
avenues of redress.' Together with the scientific community, these or-
ganizations played a significant part in developing a public consciousness
of environmental danger which aroused the concern of the ordinary
citizen. Public support for ecological reform led to the introduction of
environmental protection bills in Congress and state legislatures, and
several significant statutes were enacted at the close of the decade .°
If the environmental movement was characterized during the
1960's by a growing public awareness of the extent to which we as a
nation have despoiled the ecosystems in which we live and work, the
decade of the 1970's is destined to be characterized by the development
of what is loosely termed "environmental law." 4 This growth is occur-
ring on two levels: heightened public consciousness has already led to
the enactment of significant new statutes on both the federal and state
levels° and has nurtured an enormous increase in environmental litiga-
tion. Almost weekly a court decision preventing or delaying proposed
public and private action is handed down, and both federal and state
judges have come to accept environmental cases as appropriate actions
pursuing legitimate citizen concerns. This change in the judicial out-
look, which reflects a departure from the deference traditionally ac-
corded administrative determinations, augurs well for the future of
environmental lawsuits.° There is little doubt that, if environmental
law has not yet become an officially recognized branch of the law, it
will certainly attain this status during the decade of the seventies.
The Boston College Industrial and Commercial Law Review has
made significant contributions to the development of environmental law.
It was one of the earliest reviews to explore in depth the problems of
2 See, e.g., Environmental Defense Fund v. Corps of Engineers, 342 F. Supp. 1211
(E.D. Ark.), aff'd, 470 F.2d 289 (8th Cir. 1972).
3 See, e.g., National Environmental Policy Act of 1969 (NEPA), 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321
et seq. (1970) ; Environmental Quality Improvement Act of 1970, 42 U.S.C. §§ 4371-74
(1970). As a result of these statutes the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) was
created.
4 The titular designation "environmental Iaw" is a misnomer since it implies that a
properly delineated body of legal and scientific principles exists. The implication is im-
proper since environmental problems and their solutions are multidisciplinary in structure
and content. Environmental pollution or degradation does not emanate from a single
cause or series of causes which can be classified under one scientific or academic discipline.
Rather, the nature of any and all environmental abuses of the so-called western or in-
dustrial societies transcends many of the physical and social sciences into which the various
educational disciplines have been divided.
5 See, e.g., Clean Air Amendments of 1970, 42 U.S.C. § 1857-571 (1970) ; Federal
Water Pollution Control Act Amendments of 1972, Pub. L. No, 92-500, 86 Stat. 816
(1972) (codified with minor exceptions at 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251 et seq. (Supp. 1973)) ; Mich.
Environmental Protection Act of 1970, Mich. Comp. Laws Ann. I§ 691.1201-.1207 (Supp.
1972).
See J. Sax, Defending the Environment: A Strategy for Citizen Action, at xviii-zix,
57, 58, 60, 62, 63 (1st ed. 1971).
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environmental degradation, beginning in 1968 with a symposium treat-
ing water pollution,7 and subsequently it has focused considerable at-
tention on other aspects of environmental problems.8 Its commitment to
environmental research and scholarship continues in this issue, which
focuses on concerns at the forefront of environmental law today.
The issues that must be faced in the seventies are complex and
extremely difficult, as is evidenced by the round of litigation under the
National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) 8 and the Clean Air Act
Amendments of 1970. 10 The difficult NEPA issues which will have to
be resolved, perhaps even at the congressional level, include the extent
7 Water Use—A Symposium, 9 B.C. Ind. & Com. L. Rev, 531 (1968).
See, e.g., Bagge, The Federal Power Commission, 11 B.C. Ind. & Corn. L. Rev. 689
(1970) ; McDaniel & Kaplinsky, The Use of the Federal Income Tax System to Combat
Air and Water Pollution: A Case Study in Tax, 12 B.C. Ind. & Com. L. Rev. 351 (1971);
Franzen, Weather Modification: Law and Policy, 12 B.C. Ind. & Corn. L. Rev. 503 (1971) ;
Donovan, The Federal Government and Environmental Control: Administrative Reform
on the Executive Level, 12 B.C. Ind. & Com. L. Rev. 541 (1971); Muskie, A Legislator's
View of Impending Amendments to the Water Pollution Control Act, 13 B.C. Ind. &
Com. L. Rev. 629 (1972) ; Reis, Environmental Activism: Thermal Pollution—AEC and
State Jurisdictional Considerations, 13 B.C. Ind. & Com. L. Rev. 633 (1972) ; Cohen &
Warren, Judicial Recognition of the Substantive Requirements of the National Environ-
mental Policy Act of 1969, 13 B.C. Ind. & Corn. L. Rev. 685 (1972) ; Rodgers, The
National Industrial Pollution Control Council: Advise or Collude?, 13 B.C. Ind, & Com.
L. Rev. 719 (1972); Comment, State Air Pollution Control Legislation, 9 B.C. Ind. &
Corn. L. Rev. 712 (1968) ; Comment, The Clean Air Amendments of 1970: Better Auto-
motive Ideas From Congress, 12 B.C. Ind. &. Com. L. Rev. 571 (1971) (National Award
Winner in the 1971 Annual Environmental Law Essay Contest of the American Trial
Lawyers Association and winner of second prize in a competition sponsored by American
Society of Planning Officials and the U.C.LA.-Ford Foundation Program and Planning
of Environmental Control Law) ; Comment, Standing of Conservation Organizations to
Challenge Federal Administrative Action in Federal Court, 12 B.C. Ind. & Com. L. Rev.
637 (1971) ; Comment, Constitutional Problems in Environmental Legislation—the Mason
Law, 12 B.C. Ind. & Com. L. Rev. 657 (1971) ; Comment, Federal Pollution Legislation:
Current Proposals to Achieve More Effective Enforcement, 13 B.C. Ind. & Com. L. Rev.
749 (1972); Comment, The Scope of State and Local Government Action in Environ-
mental Land Use Regulation, 13 B.C. Ind. & Corn. L. Rev. 782 (1972).
9 See, e.g., Environmental Defense Fund v. Corps of Engineers, 342 F. Supp. 1211
(ED. Ark.), aff'd, 470 F.2d 289 (8th Cir. 1972); Hanly v. Mitchell, 460 F.2d 640 (2d
Cir. 1972) ; Natural Resources Defense Council v. Morton, 458 F.2d 827 (D.C. Cir. 1972) ;
National Helium Corp. v. Morton, 455 F.2d 650 (10th Cir. 1971) ; Scenic Hudson Preser-
vation Conf. v. FPC, 453 F.2d 463 (2d Cir. 1971) ; Ely v. Veld, 451 F.2d 1130 (4th Cir.
1971) ; Calvert Cliffs' Coordinating Comm., Inc. v. AEC, 449 F.2d 1109 (D.C. Cir. 1971) ;
Durnford v. Ruckelshaus, — F. Supp. —, 5 E.R.C. 1007 (N.D. Cal. 1973) ; Anaconda
Co. v. Ruckelshaus, 352 F. Supp. 697 (D. Colo. 1972) ; Kisner v. Butts, — F. Supp.
4 E.R.C. 1692 (N.D.W. Va. 1972) ; Sierra Club v. Mason, — F. Supp. —, 4 E.R.C, 1686
(D, Conn. 1972) ; Kalur v. Resor, 335 F. Supp. 1 (D.D.C. 1971) ; Pennsylvania Environ-
mental Council v. Bartlett, 315 F. Supp. 238 (M.D. Pa. 1970); cf. Zabel v. Tabb, 430
F.2d 199 (5th Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 401 U.S. 910 (1971).
10 See, e.g., Natural Resources Defense Council v. EPA, — F.2d —, 4 E.R.C. 1945
(D.C. Cir. 1973) ; Getty Oil Co. v. Ruckelshaus, 467 F.2d 349 (3d Cir. 1972); Kennecott
Copper Corp. v, EPA, 462 F.2d 846 (D.C. Cir. 1972); Anaconda Co. v. Ruckelshaus, 352
F. Supp. 697 (D. Colo. 1972); Riverside v. Ruckelshaus, — F. Supp. —, 4 E.R.C. 1728
(C.D. Cal. 1972).
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to which environmental agencies, especially the Environmental Protec-
tion Agency (EPA), will be subject to the mandatory procedures of
section 102 of NEPA," as well as whether, and the extent to which, the
federal judiciary will review administrative determinations for substan-
tive compliance with the policies and goals set forth in section 101 of
that statute." The significance of the former problem, which first sur-
faced in the 1971 decision Kalur v. Resor," is portrayed in a recent
district court decision, Anaconda Co. v. Ruckelshaus," holding that
NEPA applies to EPA action under the Clean Air Act despite the latter
statute's specific directions to the Administrator to accomplish stated
objectives within prescribed time periods, and despite language in sec-
tion 104 of NEPA which seemingly relieves environmental agencies of
this task." With respect to the latter problem, courts originally adhered
to the position that their jurisdiction over administrative action under
NEPA was restricted to the review of agency action in order to make
sure that environmental impact statements fully complied with the
procedural requirements set forth in sections 102(2) (C) and (D)."
11
 43 U.S.C. § 4332 (1970).
12
 43 U.S.C. § 4331 (1970).
18 335 F. Supp. 1 (D.D.C. 1971), It was this decision that undermined the permit
system established by federal regulations (Permits for Discharges or Deposits Into Navi-
gable Waters, 33 C.F.R. 209.131 (1971)) promulgated by the Army Corps of Engineers
pursuant to Executive Order No. 11574, 35 Fed. Reg. 19627 (1970).
14
 352 F. Supp. 697 (D. Colo. 1972); cf. Kennecott Copper Corp. v. EPA, 462 F.2d
349 (3d Cir. 1972).
18
 Section 104 of NEPA provides in pertinent part that "[n]othing in Section 102
or 103 shall in any way affect the specific statutory obligations of any federal agency (1)
to comply with criteria or standards of environmental quality . . . ." 42 U.S.C. 4334
(1970). For a discussion of the significance of § 104, see Calvert Cliffs' Coordinating
Comm., Inc. v. AEC, 449 F.2d 1109 (D.C. Cir. 1971). After the decision in Kalur v.
Resor, 335 F. Supp. 1 (D.D.C. 1971), Congress specifically provided, in § 511(c) of the
Federal Water Pollution Control Act Amendments of 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-500, 86 Stat.
816 (1972) (codified with minor exceptions at 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251 et seq. (Supp. 1973)),
that "no action of the administrator taken pursuant to this Act shall be deemed major
Federal action significantly affecting the quality of the human environment within the
meaning of the National Environmental Policy Act of 1972."
18 See, e.g., the district court opinion in Environmental Defense Fund v. Corps of
Engineers, 342 F. Supp. 1211 (E.D. Ark.), aff'd, 470 F.2d 289 (8th Cir. 1972). The rela-
tionship between § 102(2)(0) and § 102(2)(C) of NEPA is explained in the following
excerpt from the Eighth Circuit opinion:
This provision [§ 102(2)(D)] follows and is in addition to the § 102(2)(C)
requirement of a detailed statement discussing, inter ails, alternatives to the
proposed action. This is not to suggest, however, that the more extensive treat-
ment of alternatives required by § 102(2)(D) cannot be incorporated into the
EIS [Environmental Impact Statement]. Indeed, "it is the essence and thrust
of NEPA that the pertinent statement serve to gather in one place a discussion
of the, relevant environmental impact alternatives." National Resources Defense
Council v. Morton, 458 F.2d 827, 834 (D.C. Cir. 1972). So too, the guidelines to
the federal agencies issued by the CEQ [Council on Environmental Quality] ex-
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Mote recently, however, some circuit court decisions, principally those
in Calvert Cliffs' Coordinating Committee, Inc. v. AEC" and Environ-
mental Defense Fund v. Corps of Engineers,' 8 indicate that courts not
only will examine environmental impact statements for compliance with
the procedural formalities of section 102, but also will evaluate the deci-
sions of federal administrators in determining whether the substantive
objectives of NEPA stated in section 101 are complied with." Although
these decisions indicate that the scope of this review may well be limited
to application of the arbitrary and capricious standard, 20 there is some
suggestion that a broader review might yet be obtainable." Environ-
mentalists may be expected to adopt the suggestion and urge a broader
scope of review. It may also be assumed that environmentalists will not
remain content with the rulings of recent cases suggesting that the
public is not entitled to fully unbiased and completely objective en-
vironmental impact statements." Continued litigation on these issues,
then, is to be anticipated.
plain the import of { 102(2)(D) under the general heading "Content of En-
vironmental Statement." 36 Fed. Reg. 7724, 7725 (1971).
470 F.2d at 296.
11 449 F.2d 1109 (D.C. Cir. 1971).
18 470 F.2d 289 (8th Cir. 1972).
" See, e.g., Calvert Cliffs' Coordinating Comm., Inc. v. AEC, 449 F.2d 1109, 1115
(D.C. Cir. 1971), where the court stated:
We conclude, then, that Section 102 of NEPA mandates a particular sort
of careful and informed decisionmaking process and creates judicially enforce-
able duties. The reviewing courts probably cannot reverse a substantive decision
on its merits, under Section 101, unless it be shown that the actual balance of
costs and benefits that was struck was arbitrary or clearly gave insufficient weight
to environmental values . . .. [Emphasis added.]
See Environmental Defense Fund v. Corps of Engineers, 470 F.2d 289, 297 (8th Cir.
1972), where the court concluded:
The language of NEPA, as well as its legislative history make it clear that the
Act is more than an environmental full disclosure law. NEPA was intended to
effect substantive changes in decision making. . . . To this end, 101 sets out
specific environmental goals to serve as a set of policies to guide agency action
affecting the environment.
The court further reasoned that "an agency obligation [existed] to carry out the substan-
tive requirements of the Act. [Accordingly] courts have an obligation to review sub-
stantive agency decisions on the merits." Id. at 298. See also North Carolina Conservation
Council v. Froehlke, — F.2d —, 4 E.R.C. 2039 (4th Cir. 1973); Sierra Club v. Froehlke,
— F. Supp. —, 5 E.R.C. 1033, 1061 (S.D. Tex. 1973).
20 See Citizens to Preserve Overton Park v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402, 416 (1971), for
a discussion by the Supreme Court of arbitrary and capricious standards.
21 Cf. Environmental Defense Fund v. Corps of Engineers, 470 F.2d 289, 299 n.15
(8th Cir. 1972).
22 See, e.g., id: at 295, where the court stated:
We agree ... that NEPA "requires the agencies of the United States Govern-
ment to objectively evaluate their projects." However, we do not agree with
the view implicit in the contentions of appellants that NEPA requires agency
officials to be subjectively impartial. . . . Thus NEPA assumes as inevitable an
579
BOSTON COLLEGE INDUSTRIAL AND. COMMERCIAL LAW REVIEW
subsidiary NEPA issues awaiting final resolution relate to situations
where an agency claims that an environmental impact statement need
not be prepared and 'filed because its activity does not:constitute "major
Federal action significantly affecting the quality of the human eiwirOn-
ment."28
 Recent deCisions have approved the practice, adopted in EPA
guidelines," of permitting the agency to prepare only an informal and
less detailed "environmental assessment" statement regarding this
threshold inquiry.2'5
 And while it appears that the statutory language
describes two distinct issues within the 'area Of inquiry—first, whether
the proposed activity constitutes "major. Federal action"; second,
whether it "significantly affect [s] the quality of the human environ-
ment"—so that the challenging complainant must succeed on two issues
if he is to forestall or prevent agency action," the relevant criteria for
making this assessment remain to be settled."
institutional bias within an agency proposing a project and erects the procedural
requirements of § 102 to insure _that "there is no way [the_decision-maker] can
fail to note the facts and understand the very serious arguments advanced. by
plaintiffs if he carefully reviews the entire environmental impact statement."
An institutional bias will most often be found when the project has been
partially completed... .
The test of compliance with § 102, then, is one of good faith objectivity
rather than subjective impartiality. [Citations omitted.]
42 U.S.C. § 4332(C) (1970).
24
 37 Fed. Reg. 879-85 (1972).
Durnford v. Ruckelshaus, — F. Supp. —, 5 E.R.C. 1007 (N.D. Cal. 1973);
Kisner v. Butz, — F. Supp. —, 4 E.R.C. 1692 (N.D.W. Va. 1972); Hanly v. Mitchell,
460 F.2d 640 (2d Cir. 1972); cf. Sierra Club v. Mason, — F: Supp. —, 4 E.R.C. 1686
(2d Cir. 1972).
26
 See, e.g., Hanly v. Mitchell, 460 F.2d 640, 644 (2d Cir. 1972), where the court
held:
Plaintiffs argue that if a federal action Is "major," as defendants now concede
this one is, it must have a "significant" effect on the environment. Defendants
claim that the term "major Federal action" refers to the cost of the project,
the amount of planning that preceded it, and the time required to complete it,
but does not refer to the impact of the project upon the environment. We agree
with the defendants that the two concepts are different and that the respon-
sible federal agency has the authority to make its own threshold determination
as to each in deciding whether an impact statement is' necessary.
27 Compare Hanly v. Mitchell, 460 F.2d 640'(2d Cir. 1972), Sierra Club v. Mason,
— F. Supp. —, 4 E.R.C. 1815 (D.C: Cir. 1972), and Kisner v. Butz, — F. Supp.
4 E.R.C. 1692 (N.D.W. Va. 1972). Although in Hardy the Second Circuit agreed that
"[T]he term 'major Federal action' refers to the cost of the project, the amount of
planning that preceded it, and the time required to complete it . . . ," 460 F.2d at 644,
it indicated broader criteria for determining. whether the project would "significantly"
affect the environment, stating:
The National Environmental Policy Act contains no exhaustive list of so-called
"environmental considerations," but without question its aims extend beyond
sewage and garbage and even beyond water and air pollution: The Act must be
construed to include protection of the quality of life for city residents. Noise,
traffic; overburdened mass transportation systems, crime, congestion, and even
580
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The severity and complexity of the Clean Air Act issues are exem-
plified by the appellate decision in a recent motor vehicle emission
standards case" and in the resultant action of the EPA Administrator
granting a one-year extension for the attainment of emission limits
originally set for 1975," despite the success of two Japanese firms in
solving the technological problems inherent in reducing automotive
emissions." Other examples of the complexities of the issues arising
under the Act are developed in the articles and comments presented in
this issue. Perhaps this complexity is most vividly seen in the article by
Ms. Schachter, which evaluates state and local air pollution control
regulations and points out many of the inadequacies of the implementa-
tion plans adopted under the Clean Air Act, and in Mr. Luneburg's
examination of federal-state interaction under the same statute. Sub-
sidiary issues of statutory construction, covering the relationship be-
tween the appeal provisions of section 307 and the citizen suit provisions
of section 304, are explored in the comment on developments under the
Clean Air Act. Last year, in Illinois v. City of Milwaukee, 81 the Su-
preme Court resurrected old precedents" and reestablished a federal
common law of nuisance as an appropriate remedy for pollution control.
In so doing, the Court provided support for a lower court decision
proceeding upon a federal common law theory in a public nuisance
context" and dispelled any possible contrary implications arising from
its opinion in another case decided the previous year." The impact of
City of Milwaukee has been swift and dramatic. In recent decisions,
two federal district courts have extended the doctrine beyond the scope
of the Supreme Court decision and seemingly authorized its use as a
means of evading the strictures of express legislative remedies." The
problems engendered by this case and the danger it poses for carefully
availability of drugs all affect the urban "environment" and are surely results
of the "profound influences of . . . high-density urbanization [and] industrial
expansion." Section 101(a) of the Act, 42 U.S.C. § 4331(a).
Id. at 647 (citations omitted).
28 International Harvester Co. v. Rutkelshaus, 	 F.2d —, 4 E.R.C. 2041 (D.C.
Cir. 1973).
29 Wall Street Journal, April 12, 1973, at 1, col. 6.
80 Id. at 3, col. 1.
31 406 U.S. 91 (1972).
62 New Jersey v. City of New York, 283 U.S. 473 (1931); New York v. New
Jersey, 256 U.S. 296 (1921); Missouri v. Illinois, 200 U.S. 496 (1906); Pennsylvania
v. Wheeling Bridge Co., 54 U.S. (13 How.) 556 (1851).
sa Texas v. Pankey, 441 F.2d 236 (I0th Cir. 1971).
84 In Ohio v. Wyandotte Chem. Corp., 401 U.S. 493 (1971), the Court, in declining
to accept original jurisdiction, suggested that public nuisance was grounded in state
rather than federal law.
86 United States v. United States Steel Corp., — F. Supp, —, 5 E.R.C. 1125 (N.D.
Ill. 1973); United States v. Ira S. Bushey & Sons, Inc., 346 F. Supp. 145 (D. Vt. 1972).
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formulated and limited statutory remedies are explored herein in the
casenote on United States v. Ira S. Bushey & Sons, Inc."
Perhaps the most significant recent development was the passage
of the Federal Water Pollution Control Act. Amendments of 1972" over
the President's veto on .October 18, 1972. As one congressman has re-
marked, these amendments have "totally restructur [ed] the water
pollution program" and constitute "a far-reaching national commitment
to clean water."" This development has not been overlooked, and an
exhaustive comment analyzing the amendments appears herein.
At this juncture, then, with environmental law growing apace, we
have endeavored in this issue of the Review to present essays highlight-
ing recent developments and explaining current problems which, it is
hoped, anticipate the-bases of significant .future litigation. I take, pride
in recommending the issue to your attention.
86 346 F. Supp. 145 (D. Vt. 1972).
87 Pub. L. No. 92-500, 86 Stat. 816 (1972) (codified with minor exceptions at 33
U.S.C. ft 1251 et seq. (Supp. 1973)).
38 118 Cong. Rec. H2481 (daily ed. March 27, 1972) (remarks of Rep. Blatnik).
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